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WHOSE LAWFARE IS IT, ANYWAY? 
David Scheffer* 
The growing interest in “lawfare,” particularly as it applies to 
American and Israeli military operations, requires a realistic assessment of 
the nature of the alleged threat and the responses to it.  The popular view of 
lawfare, put forward by neo-conservative commentators and some military 
lawyers, is exceptionally myopic, oblivious to how other nations view inter-
national justice, and disingenuous regarding America‟s own aggressive use 
of the law to confront perpetrators of atrocity crimes during times of armed 
conflict.  Lawfare critics cannot have it both ways, arguing that the United 
States is being unfairly singled out and erroneously attacked in judicial 
forums for allegedly illegal conduct and then contending that unconven-
tional threats permit responses and military strategies that diverge from 
well-established international law.  Perhaps the most significant example of 
major-power lawfare today, at least from an African perspective, is the In-
ternational Criminal Court and its five situations under investigation on the 
African continent. 
 
Greater care needs to be taken with use of the term ―lawfare,‖ 
which in common parlance has come to describe how weaker nations, civil 
society, insurgents, terrorists, and scholars exploit domestic law, interna-
tional law, and judicial institutions to influence the foreign and military 
policies of major powers.1 Often, the target becomes U.S. or Israeli policy. 
Lawfare is a particular form of asymmetrical warfare using the rule of law, 
or a particular interpretation of the law, to thwart the use of military power 
  
 *  David Scheffer is the Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and Director of 
the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of Law. He 
was the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues (1997–2001). 
 1 David B. Rivkin & Lee Casey, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2007, at A11 (defining 
lawfare as ―tool of war‖ and its growing use in international claims, with purpose of 
―gain[ing] a moral advantage over your enemy in the court of world opinion‖); DAVID 
KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 13 (2006) (―To say that war is a legal institution is not only to 
say that war has also become an affair of rules or the military a legal bureaucracy.  It is also 
to say something about the nature of the politics continued by military means.‖); David Lu-
ban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 2020 (2008) (―This 
would be in keeping with the concept of  ‗lawfare,‘ by which is meant the use of internation-
al law and litigation as a method of gaining military advantage.  Some commentators regard 
lawfare as an insidious tool of America‘s enemies, including internationalist NGOs with an 
agenda to promote.‖). 
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of far superior means. ―Lawfare,‖ as described by a Council on Foreign 
Relations study group I participated in several years ago, is the strategy of 
using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional uses of military force in 
order to achieve military objectives.2   
I wrote in the Financial Times on May 6, 2004, that,  
[The] central premise [of ―lawfare‖] advances a conspiracy to constrain the 
use of US military force worldwide by using the ‗soft‘ weapon of interna-
tional law and its ‗sovereignty-bashing‘ treaties as well as anti-US inter-
pretations of principles of customary international law . . . The military po-
lice reservist who ‗softens up‘ detainees for another round of enlightened 
interrogation may not have the foggiest notion about this theoretical joust 
[about lawfare] in the halls of power. But the top civilian and military 
leaders know, fear and resist ‗lawfare‘—and this, in turn has clearly un-
dermined their respect for international law.
3
  
Most of the commentary on lawfare focuses on the alleged threat it 
poses to U.S. military armed forces globally and Israel‘s military superiority 
in the Middle East.
 
The American/Israeli-centric definition and view of law-
fare might lead one to believe that it is only the United States and its ally, 
Israel, that stand imperiled before the onslaught of weaker nations using 
judicial processes to challenge U.S. or Israeli military might. The great 
fear—and fear aptly describes the intellectual anxiety about lawfare—is that 
the justified use of American or Israeli military force will be thwarted by 
aggressive advocacy of international law in courtrooms, U.N. forums, and 
the world media. 
I want to suggest that this view of lawfare is exceptionally myopic, 
oblivious to how other nations view international justice, and disingenuous 
regarding America‘s own aggressive use of the law to confront perpetrators 
of atrocity crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes—
particularly during times of armed conflict. The lawfare scare risks creating 
a slippery slope towards illegal and perhaps criminal conduct on the part of 
two great nations and their civilian and military leadership. The aftermath of 
9/11, namely, the so-called ―war on terror,‖ has generated so much fear that 
some appear to fear the law itself.4 International law, or, for that matter, 
federal criminal or military law, indeed may challenge the projection of 
American armed forces somewhere in the world because of the character of 
the particular military action or its transnational application. Why is anyone 
  
 2 Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries – Rapporteur‟s Report, Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, March 18, 2003, at https://secure.www.cfr.org/publication/5753/lawfare_the_latest_in_ 
asymmetries_rapporteurs_report.html.  
 3 David Scheffer, The Legal Double Standards of Bush‟s War, FIN. TIMES, May 6, 2004, 
at 21. 
 4 See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY (2007). 
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surprised that foreign governments, non-governmental organizations, and 
international organizations, such as the United Nations, will fight back with 
the law in legal settings or simply in the media? Even terrorist entities may 
use propaganda in the media and in the courts to jump on the lawfare wa-
gon.5  
Several distinguished Judge Advocate General officers and neo-
conservative legal scholars have authored articles revealing the self-evident 
elements of lawfare and practically pleading for relief from such tactics so 
that the United States can act unhindered, or at least devoid of criticism, in 
fighting terrorist threats.6 They criticize non-compliance with the law of war 
by foreign enemies and usually, but not always, confirm the need for U.S. 
compliance with the law of war.7 But that acknowledgement is drowned 
  
 5 Brooke Goldstein & Aaron Eitan Meyer, “Legal Jihad”: How Islamist Lawfare Tactics 
Are Targeting Free Speech, 15 ILSA J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 395, 397 (2009) (discussing differ-
ent strategies employed by ―Islamic states, organizations and individuals‖ who are using 
lawsuits ―as a weapon of war against counter-terrorism experts, law enforcement personnel, 
politicians, and anyone working to disseminate information on Islamist terrorism and its 
sources of financing‖). 
 6 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Val-
ues in 21st Century Conflicts, (Carr Center for Human Rights, John F. Kennedy Sch. of 
Gov‘t, Harvard U., Working Paper, 2001), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/ 
Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf [hereinafter Dunlap, 
Law and Military Interventions]; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare: A Decisive Element of 21st-
Century Conflict?,  54 JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY 34 (2009); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare 
Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT‘L AFF. 146 (2008) [hereinafter Dunlap, Lawfare Today]; 
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Amid Warfare, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at A19, available 
at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/aug/3/lawfare-amid-warfare [hereinafter-
Dunlap, Lawfare Amid Warfare]; Laurie R. Blank, The Application of IHL in the Goldstone 
Reprot: A Critical Commentary, 12 YEARBOOK OF INT‘L HUMANITARIAN L.  (forthcoming 
2009); Kelly D. Wheaton, Strategic Lawyering: Realizing the Potential of Military Lawyers 
at the Strategic Level, 2006 ARMY LAW. 1; David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Rocky 
Shoals of International Law, 62 THE NAT‘L INT. 35 (2000) [hereinafter Rivkin & Casey, The 
Rocky Shoals]; David B. Rivkin, Jr., & Lee A. Casey, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2007, 
at A11 [hereinafter Rivkin & Casey, Lawfare]; Andrew C. McCarthy, Lawfare Strikes Again, 
NAT‘L. REV. ONLINE, (Jun. 12, 2007, 10:10 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/ 
221258/lawfare-strikes-again/andrew-c-mccarthy (last visited Nov. 4, 2010); Anne Herzberg, 
NGO “Lawfare”: Exploitation of Courts in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, NGO MONITOR (Sept. 
2008); Eric Talbott Jensen, The ICJ‟s „Uganda Wall‟: A Barrier to the Principle of Distinc-
tion and an Entry Point for Lawfare, 35 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 241 (2007); Richard L. 
Cravatts, “Lawfare:” Another Weapon in the Jihad Against Israel, AMER. CHRONICLE, (Jan. 
12, 2009), http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/87526 (last visited Nov. 4, 
2010); Scott Horton, Lawfare Redux, HARPER‘S MAG., Mar. 12, 2010, http://www.harpers. 
org/archive/2010/03/hbc-90006694 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 7 See generally supra note 6 and accompanying text (E.g., Rivkin, & Casey, Lawfare 
(criticizing use of lawfare by al-Qaeda and the Taliban while suggesting the United States 
fight lawfare legally and politically) but see Dunlap, Lawfare Amid Warfare (implying that 
breach of the laws of war may be justified as a ―more humane approach to kill bad guys 
when the opportunity presents itself even though some civilian losses may also occur‖)). 
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under tidal waves of accusations that someone out there is trying to use the 
rule of law to vastly complicate, perhaps even reverse, the projection of 
American power.8 It is an argument that melds easily into the belief that the 
United States is an exceptional nation entitled to exceptional privileges in 
the conduct of warfare and exceptions to the principles of international law. 
If the United States is an exceptional nation, then how dare others throw the 
law books at the United States when its mission is so vital both to the Amer-
ican people and, by extension, to the free world? 
I hope I am exaggerating, but I do so to make a fundamental point: 
When one undertakes a detailed analysis of asymmetrical warfare morphing 
into lawfare against the United States or Israel, there remains the need to 
objectively examine military conduct against a reasonable interpretation, 
and not re-interpretation, of international law.  The key reasoning should be 
to use the law as a shield against the accusations that are the weapons of 
lawfare. As some lawfare critics themselves recognize, so often the allega-
tions are misguided and ill-informed interpretations of international law, 
with little understanding of military doctrine.9  
Yet the impression left by so many in the commentariat is that the 
United States is intimidated by the allegations of lawfare operatives to such 
an extent that American officials are practically paralyzed by the expe-
rience, incapable or unwilling to defend, or inexplicably tardy in defending 
their actions as being in full compliance with reasonable interpretations of 
both federal and international law.10 The strategy employed by these archi-
tects of fear is largely to shoot the messenger rather than confront the legal 
challenges conveyed by the messenger, however annoying or even danger-
ous they may be, with confidence and integrity.11 They have created the 
straw man of lawfare to avoid answering the tough questions about the le-
gality of foreign and military policies and operations.12 Many in the com-
  
 8 See generally supra note 6 and accompanying text; Clare M. Lopez, SEALs Case Shows 
How Terrorists Use “Lawfare” to Undermine U.S., HUMAN EVENTS (Mar. 8, 2010), 
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=35934. 
 9 See Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions, supra note 6, at 21 (discussing the ―in-
complete understanding‖ of the laws of war by military people) See also Herzberg, supra 
note 6, at 6 (noting a lack of understanding of the laws of war by the NGOs that attempt to 
take advantage of  universal jurisdiction). 
 10 See Dunlap, Law and Military Interventions, supra note 6, at 35−37 (discussing need 
for cooperation); Dunlap, Lawfare Today, supra note 6, at 152−53 (commenting on chal-
lenge to the national security community); Phillip Carter, Legal Combat: Are Enemies Wag-
ing War in Our Courts?, SLATE MAGAZINE (Apr. 3, 2005, 5:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
default.aspx?id=3944&da=&qt=%22legal+combat%22&submit.x=0&submit.y=0 (noting the 
administration‘s fear of lawfare). 
 11 See Carter, supra note 10; Rivkin & Casey, The Rocky Shoals, supra note 6, at 35. 
 12 See generally Rivkin & Casey, The Rocky Shoals, supra note 6 (discussing the use of 
international law against the United States). 
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mentariat recoil at the entirely predictable legal challenges and second-
guessing by critics threatening the implementation of military policies, par-
ticularly against terrorists.13  
The critique of lawfare would be more sustainable if the George W. 
Bush Administration had not waged the Iraqi War on false premises and had 
not engaged in years of detention, interrogation, and military commission 
practices that attracted significant criticism as illegal under international law 
and even unconstitutional under U.S. law.14 The Obama Administration, 
despite its new policy pronouncements of respect for international law, has 
continued the use, albeit reformed, of the military commissions and pro-
longed detentions without trial of some terrorist suspects.  It has held certain 
individuals long after they were determined not to be terrorists or other 
threats to national security.  The Justice Department recently prosecuted one 
child soldier before a military commission.  All of this does not help the 
cause of elevating the United States out of the ditch the Bush team had 
dug.15  
The credibility of protestations over lawfare within the international com-
munity would be significantly enhanced if not for these realities. Much of 
the critique of lawfare aims at those who would challenge the tactics of the 
so-called ―war on terror‖ with judicial responses. One gets the impression 
that the American position is so weak under international law that officials, 
and their apologists, are flailing at those who logically resort to the courts to 
enforce international law, particularly as it is embodied within U.S. federal 
law, as well as the constitutional rights of detainees.  
  
 13 Transcript, Lawfare, the Latest in Assymetrics, Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 18, 
2003), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/5772/lawfare_the_latest_in_asymmetries. 
html. 
 14 See generally  M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TORTURE BY THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2010); PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD‘S MEMO AND 
THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES (2008); JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION‘S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE ―WAR‖ ON TERROR (2007); JACK L. 
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2007); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR 
ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008) (discussing practices that 
occurred during the Bush administration). 
 15 Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, The Obama Administration and 
International Law, Address before the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/ 
139119.htm; Dahlia Lithwick, The Sins of Guantanamo: We‟re Keeping Detainees in the 
Camp Because We‟re Afraid of Things They Haven‟t Done Yet?, SLATE MAGAZINE (Jan. 26, 
2010, 6:29 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2240625; Charlie Savage, Child Soldier for Al 
Qaeda is Sentenced for War Crimes, NY TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, at A16; DAHLIA Lithwick, 
The Real Tragedy of Gitmo: Why Khadr Shouldn‟t be Tried There, NEWSWEEK, (Aug. 12, 
2010), http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/12/why-khadr-shouldn-t-be-tried-at- 
guantanamo.html. 
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The truer strategy would be to confront lawfare with the confidence 
of a nation using military force in full compliance with the law of war and 
with international humanitarian law.16 This strategy requires hard work and 
the will to demonstrate that American policies, whether they are related to 
the use of military force or to how the United States deals with detained 
suspects of terrorism, in fact comply with international law. But this must 
not be a strategy that figures out some way to violate the law and still justify 
such violations. If that is the objective, then one needs to argue for new or 
amended laws and comply with existing law until such new or amended 
laws come to pass. In the meantime, civilian and military officials who vi-
olate the law should be investigated and, if merited, prosecuted in federal 
and military courts.  
Lawfare critics cannot have it both ways, arguing on the one hand 
that the United States is being unfairly singled out and erroneously attacked 
in judicial forums for allegedly illegal conduct and, on the other hand, con-
tending that unconventional threats permit responses and military strategies 
that diverge from well-established international law. Either the United 
States, as the world‘s major military, economic, and democratic power, can 
confidently and vigorously defend its actions under reasonable interpreta-
tions of international law, and thus defeat lawfare as it is waged through the 
media, in law journals, and in the courtrooms, or it can cower in the face of 
lawfare and appear utterly intimidated by the prospect of having to explain 
its actions under the rule of law. Either the United States acts within the 
parameters of international law and federal law, or it deviates from legal 
principles and international treaties long recognized as the bedrock of 
America‘s moral and legal standing in the world. 
The messiness that lawfare imposes is a reality that everyone should 
accept. Simply alleging lawfare, as if it were some evil design, does nothing 
to enhance American security or create a sustainable response to false or ill-
informed allegations. Policymakers must not use their annoyance with law-
fare as the pretext for conduct they suspect may diverge from international 
law, or at least arguably does so to the extent that lawfare activists actually 
have credible arguments to make, ones that deserve well-reasoned res-
ponses. 
Lawfare is neither a uniquely American nor an Israeli concern.17 
The commentariat overlook that whatever argument is made in opposition 
to lawfare is also available to other nations in their relationships with the 
United States and Israel. Much of the world easily would identify the United 
  
 16 See, e.g., Davida E. Kellogg, International Law and Terrorism, MIL. REV. 50, 50 (Sept.–
Oct. 2005) (stating that the United States should develop its own comprehensive and proac-
tive law fighting doctrine). 
 17 Id. (stating that any members of the International Law of Armed Conflict can use law-
fare as a powerful weapon in the Global War on Terrorism). 
File: Scheffer 2 Created on: 12/23/2010 9:37:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:12:00 PM 
2010] WHOSE LAWFARE IS IT, ANYWAY? 221 
States as the primary architect and proponent of lawfare.18 In their eyes, the 
definition of ―lawfare‖ would more suitably be defined as stronger nations 
using judicial processes to challenge weaker nations and win advantages 
otherwise unattainable, or undesired, through the use of raw military power 
or political compromise.19 In fact, some would view the American role dur-
ing the last two decades as being at the forefront of law-building coloniali-
zation throughout much of the world, including the nations that were libe-
rated with the end of the Cold War and third world countries burdened with 
corruption and vastly underdeveloped legal systems.20 Further, the deceptive 
manner in which the United States intervened in Iraq in 2003 and then oc-
cupied it in defiance of elements of occupation law surely left a bitter lega-
cy, making charges of lawfare pale in comparison.21 
I plead guilty to being a major perpetrator of lawfare, on behalf of 
the U.S. Government, during the 1990s. My mission, both as senior adviser 
and counsel to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 
and then as America‘s first Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, 
was to use the power of the United States to build international and hybrid 
criminal tribunals that would subject the leaders of other nations and rebel 
movements engaged in warfare, including internal armed conflicts, to inter-
national criminal justice. I used the law aggressively and continuously and 
sometimes such actions served as at least a partial rationale for avoiding the 
use of American armed might or more political negotiations. From the pers-
pective of the Serbs, the Hutus, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra 
Leone, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and the Indonesian Government, the 
tribunal-building endeavors of the 1990s and the subsequent tracking down 
of alleged war criminals were exercises in lawfare on steroids.22 Objections 
from indigenous parties bedeviled every tribunal-building exercise.23 The 
United States, its major power allies, and the U.N. Security Council im-
  
 18 See Gideon M. Hart, Note, Military Commissions and the Leiber Code: Toward a New 
Understanding of the Jurisdictional Foundations of Military Commissions, 203 MIL. L. REV. 
1, 15 (2010) (stating that one of the first instances in which lawfare was used took place in 
the United States in 1862 as a response to guerilla activity in Missouri). 
 19 Id. at 15–16 (describing ―lawfare‖ as the process of using military commissions to target 
individuals who are actively at arms against the U.S. Government). 
 20 See Walter Laqueur, After the Cold War: The Euphoria did not Last, AMERICA.GOV 
(Apr. 1, 2006), http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2006/April/20080522121256 
WRybakcuH8.543032e-02.html (discussing the central role of the United States in interna-
tional peace keeping after the Cold War). 
 21 See David Scheffer, Beyond Occupational Law, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 842, 851 (2003) 
(discussing the legal risk the United States took when it opposed the U.N. Security Council 
mandated mission and intervened in Iraq). 
 22 DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: THE BIRTH OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
(Princeton University Press forthcoming 2011). 
 23 Id. 
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posed judicial processes on warring parties throughout the 1990s.24 These 
included the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Cham-
bers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the U.N. courts set up in East Timor 
and Kosovo.25  Weak nations had to swallow essentially what the power-
ful nations imposed upon them through the creation of these tribunals, 
which held leaders responsible for violations of international criminal law.26 
Through the years, defense counsels have argued that the tribunals are ille-
gitimate under U.N. law and international law, and that the judges have mi-
sinterpreted the substantive law in violation of the rights of their clients.27 
One can certainly understand if Serbs, for example, view the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as a judicial institu-
tion imposed by the major NATO powers and if they further believe that the 
ICTY wrongfully adjudicated that the actions of their civilian and military 
leaders during the Balkans war were in violation of international law.28 
The commentariat often point to the ICTY inquiry into the NATO 
bombings during the Kosovo conflict as an example of how lawfare is used 
to second-guess major power decision-making on targeting.29 Questions 
surrounding the legality of the targeting decisions arose very early during 
  
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See generally INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: SIERRA LEONE, 
EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA (Cesare P.R. Romano, André Nollkaemper & Jann K. 
Kleffner eds., 2004) (discussing the practice and application of the Sierra Leone. East Timor, 
Kosovo, and Cambodian tribunals); JOHN R.W.D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA (2d ed. 
2000) (discussing the practice and application of the ICTY and ICTR). 
 27 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 50, 53, 64 (2006) (discussing how multiple de-
fendants have raised issues on both legitimacy and interpretation of international law; ―[t]he 
principles set out . . . have been upheld in . . . rulings on challenges to the establishment of 
both the ICTY [Milosevic (IT-02-54-PT)] and the ICTR [Kanyabashi (ICTR-96-15-T)]‖; 
―[t]he issue [of the tribunal‘s legitimacy] has returned from time to time [Kordic (IT-95-
14/2-PT)] . . .‖; ―defendants have argued that the tribunals should not rely upon interpreta-
tions that are inconsistent with customary international law [Niyitegeka (ICTR-96-14-A)].‖). 
 28 See Diane F. Orentlicher, Shrinking the Space for Denial: The Impact of the ICTY in 
Serbia, OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 25–35 (May 2008), http://www.soros.org 
/initives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/publications/serbia_2008052
0/serbia_20080501.pdf (discussing how the early ―anti-Hague‖ and ―anti-Western‖ sentiment 
toward the ICTY in Serbia stemmed from the Nationalist government fed propaganda). 
 29 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (February 
2000), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/nato/; the series of scholarly articles on 
NATO‟s Kosovo Intervention in 93 AJIL 824-862 (October 1999); Dunlap, Law and Military 
Interventions, at 15, 17; Robert S. Dudney, Warfare v. Lawfare, airforce-magazine.com, May 
19, 2010, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/June%202010/ 
0610edit.aspx. 
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the bombing campaign and should not have been surprising.30 In reality, 
once Washington and its NATO partners organized their review of the tar-
geting decisions, their response to the ICTY demonstrated a professional 
and confident assertion of the facts and the careful review that went into 
each targeting decision prior to execution. No ICTY indictments were is-
sued and, indeed, the ICTY prosecutor found no basis for investigating 
NATO for war crimes violations.31 Aggravated, but not intimidated by the 
ICTY inquiries, the Clinton Administration worked with NATO headquar-
ters to respond to every question posed by the ICTY Prosecutor.32  The legal 
persuasion and sound reasoning behind every NATO bombing run under 
inquiry presents a good example of a response to lawfare. In my view, the 
exercise demonstrated that calm, reasoned responses to legal challenges will 
show U.S. compliance with international law rather than an attitude of fear, 
if not panic, at the thought of having to justify one‘s actions under the rule 
of law. 
Perhaps the most significant example of major-power lawfare today 
is the International Criminal Court (ICC). The commentariat believe that the 
ICC may be used by weak nations or by a rogue prosecutor to isolate and 
shame the United States.33 They fear that lawfare will prevent Washington 
from using its military power for just cause through the threat of investiga-
tion and prosecution of its often controversial policies and actions.34 In other 
words, the weak will intimidate the strong—the United States or Israel—
into submission by threatening ICC scrutiny.35 The ICC Prosecutor‘s Iraq 
  
 30 See Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Office of the Prosecutor, Final 
Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Cam-
paign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶¶ 28–56, available at http://www.icty. 
org/sid/10052 (discussing the legality of NATO‘s bombing campaign targeting during the 
Kosovo conflict) (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 31 Id. ¶¶ 28–56, 90–91 (discussing the bombing campaign targeting decisions, NATO‘s 
response, and recommendations of the committee). 
 32 See DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: THE BIRTH OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 
Chapter 10: Crime Scene Kosovo (Princeton University Press, forthcoming  2011). 
 33 See generally, e.g., W. Chadwick Austin & Antony Barone Kolenc, Who‟s Afraid of the 
Big Bad Wolf? The International Criminal Court as a Weapon of Asymmetric Warfare? 39 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 291 (2006) (discussing how ―[a]dversaries of the United States 
could potentially use three asymmetric tactics to exploit the ICC: (1) misusing the Court‘s 
investigative processes, (2) filing questionable or fraudulent complaints for the Court to 
investigate, and (3) employing mass media in ICC cases to intensify international pressure 
against the United States‖ in order to isolate the United States from its coalition in the war on 
terror). 
 34 Id. at 335–338 (discussing how one of the main objectives of adversaries of the United 
States will be to use the threat of the ICC to force policymakers and military leaders to 
second guess their policy implementation and military actions). 
 35 Id. at 335–344 (discussing how the ―adversaries of the [strong] will [use the threat of the 
ICC] to achieve three main objectives to combat the war on terror: (1) creating risk-averse 
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inquiry, however, led to no action against either the United States or the 
United Kingdom.36 Nor has anything yet emerged from the ICC‘s prelimi-
nary review of the Rome Statute Article 12(3) declaration lodged by the 
Palestinian National Authority on January 22, 2009, regarding Israeli ac-
tions in the Gaza Strip in early 2008.37 No one should be surprised that the 
ICC was presented with these issues, but neither should lawfare critics re-
spond by simply trying to shoot the messenger. There are substantive ques-
tions about the conduct of warfare that must be addressed and the real task 
is to figure out precisely how that will be accomplished with the credibility 
and confidence that should be expected of great nations. 
It is hardly surprising that some foreign officials view strong na-
tions as having employed the ICC against weaker nations. The five situa-
tions under investigation by the ICC in Africa demonstrate that point, with 
Darfur perhaps being the best example of what some might view as major-
power lawfare.38 The major powers were not prepared to commit hundreds 
of thousands of troops to a ground invasion of Darfur to ensure the end of 
genocide and other atrocity crimes there.39 They were prepared, however, 
through the U.N. Security Council, to deploy a non-combat peacekeeping 
force, though far too slowly, and to refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC 
in 2005 for investigation and prosecution of top Sudanese and rebel lead-
ers.40 Once the ICC Prosecutor indicted Sudanese President Omar Hassan 
Al Bashir, the African Union and the Arab League, as well as the Sudanese 
Government, balked and accused the United States and other major powers 
of using the ICC to unjustifiably target Africa and African leaders.41 The 
  
behavior by U.S. policymakers and military leaders, (2) diverting resources and attention 
from the primary mission of fighting terrorism, and (3) splitting up international coalitions 
that support the war on terror.‖).  
 36 Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (Feb. 
9, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F596D08D-D810-43A2-99BB-
B899B9C5BCD2/277422/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf.  
 37 The Office of the Prosecutor published a summary of Palestinian National Authority 
submissions on May 3, 2010, but it has not yet resolved the issue. Palestine, INT‘L CRIM. CT., 
http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Comm
+and+Ref/Palestine/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 38 See All Situations, INT‘L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+ 
Cases/Situations/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (addressing the situations in Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Uganda, Darfur (Sudan), and The Republic of 
Kenya). 
 39 See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (resolving the matter 
through methods other than ground invasion). 
 40 Id. ¶ 1. 
 41 See Christian Lowe, AU Leaders Vote to End Bashir Cooperation with ICC, REUTERS, 
July 4, 2009, available at http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE56301X20090704? 
pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0 (indicating that the African Union requested a 
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ICC did object to military force, but made the representation that the major 
powers chose to use the weapon of law against the relatively weak govern-
ment of Sudan.42 The American‘s use of law as a weapon is evident in its 
support of the ICC‘s investigation of Darfur and its indictment of President 
Al Bashir. This position is a potent one that I fully support.  
The Clinton Administration endured much cynical commentary for 
supporting the creation of the ICTY in 1993, a powerful new legal wedge to 
help deter or stop the atrocities in the Balkans. Critics viewed the ICTY as 
the convenient policy alternative to employing decisive military force in the 
region to put an end to the war and its atrocities.43 Though this criticism is 
misplaced, the fact remains that the ICTY was a legal weapon in the conflict 
and left the impression that its creation rationalized holding back on military 
engagement in the Balkans.44 One might conclude that the strong NATO 
nations relied on the relatively cheap weapon of law to confront the warring 
and far weaker nations engaged in the Balkans conflict. 
Similarly, the ICTY indictment of Serbian President Slobodan Mi-
losevic in May 1999 proved to be a compelling legal battering ram that was 
emblematic of how useful lawfare can be, even when joined with the use of 
military force—in this case, the ongoing Kosovo conflict at the time.45 Oth-
er ICTY indictments were used during the Balkans conflict to corner, iso-
late, and shame top political and military leaders and hence influence the 
course of the war prior to any commitment of NATO troops to Bosnia.46 
From the Bosnian Serb perspective, for example, the ICTY probably 
represents the most aggressive form of lawfare. 
  
deferment to the ICC proceedings because they compromise the peace efforts in Darfur); 
Arab Leaders Back “Wanted” Bashir, BBC NEWS, Mar. 30, 2009, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7971624.stm; see also Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-
01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf; Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second 
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir (July 12, 2010). 
 42 See Lowe, supra note 41. 
 43 See, e.g., GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE 207–208, 214–215 
(2000) (describing the ICTY as a token gesture that had no legal teeth); SAMANTHA POWER, 
A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 483–484 (2002) (characteriz-
ing the ICTY as a means by which Americans could cheaply and safely signal their solidarity 
with Bosnians); ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 112 (1998) (labeling the institution of the tribunal as ―a substitute for 
effective action‖). 
 44 David Scheffer, Three Memories from the Year of Origin: 1993, 2 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 
353, 353–357 (2004). 
 45 See generally, Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment (May 22, 1999), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-ii990524e.htm.  
 46 See, e.g., Payam Akhavam, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Pre-
vent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT‘L L. 7, 15 (2001) (noting that Radovan Karadzic was 
forced out of public political life following his indictment by the ICTY in 1996). 
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The same point of view no doubt consumes the thoughts of many in 
the Rwandan Government with respect to the ICTR, certain elements within 
the Cambodian Government regarding the quasi-international ECCC, and 
the Kenyan Government regarding the ICC, which recently confirmed the 
Prosecutor‘s independent application for an investigation of electoral vi-
olence in Kenya.47 In fact, Kenya welcomed Sudan President Al Bashir to 
Nairobi on August 27, 2010, to celebrate the signing ceremony of the new 
Kenyan Constitution, despite the fact that Kenya is a State Party to the 
Rome Statute of the ICC and that the ICC is investigating the violence sur-
rounding the Kenyan elections of late 2007 and early 2008.48 Kenyan offi-
cials cited the priority of peace and stability in the region and their com-
pliance with the African Union‘s political stance against the ICC as a 
Northern-controlled tribunal targeting Africa and Africans.49 The Govern-
ment of Chad also embraced a visit by Al Bashir in late July, even though 
Chad is a State Party to the ICC and absorbed hundreds of thousands of 
refugees from the violence in Darfur.50 Even though most are State Parties 
to the Rome Statute, African nations view the ICC through the lens of their 
own sovereign identities.51 The Court, backed by the major powers, includ-
ing the United States on investigations and prosecutions relating to the Dar-
fur situation and, for that matter, other African investigations, has come to 
represent the quintessential bastion of lawfare by mostly Western nations 
against the leaders of Africa. 
It is a fool‘s errand to rationalize the end of lawfare. We all need to 
calm down. Lawfare is a reality that is self-evident and not as threatening as 
some might argue. The key is not to be intimidated by it, but to have enough 
  
 47 See Mba Chidi Nmaju, Violence in Kenya: Any Role for the ICC in the Quest for Ac-
countability?, 3 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD., 78, 79 (2009). 
 48 See Alan Cowell, Sudan Leader Travels Despite Warrant, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/28/world/africa/28sudan.html?scp=4&sq=Alan%20Cowell
&st=cse. 
 49 See Press Release, African Union, On the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC 
Informing the UN Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Sta-
tute About the Presence of President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of the Sudan in the Territories 
of the Republic of Chad and the Republic of Kenya, Press Release No. 119/21010 (Aug. 29, 
2010), available at http://www.africa-uion.org/root/ua/actualites/2010/aout/press%20release 
%20on%20the%20decision%20of%20the%20pre%20trial%20of%20the%20icc%20informin
g%20the%20un%20security%20council%20about%20president%20albashir%20of%20the%
20sudan%20presence%20in%20the%20ter.doc (denouncing members of the Security Coun-
cil for criticizing Kenya and Chad for pursuing their ―interest in ensuring peace and stability‖ 
by hosting al-Bashir); Michael Onyiego, Kenya Defends Bashir Visit as Necessary for Re-
gional Peace, VOICE OF AMERICA, Aug. 29, 2010, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/ 
africa/Kenya-Defends-Bashir-Visit-as-Necessary-for-Regional-Peace--101753813.html. 
 50 Sudan‟s President Bashir Defies Arrest Warrant in Chad, BBC NEWS (July 21, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10718399.  
 51 See Onyiego, supra note 49, at 2. 
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confidence in the legality of a nation‘s foreign and military policies to re-
spond to the predictable allegations that always accompany bold and con-
troversial uses of military force. If such response means ultimately appear-
ing in a court of law, then that may be necessary and a task that comes with 
major power responsibilities. The wrong course is to seek some kind of im-
munity from lawfare so that military power can be exercised without legal 
justification or constraint. I am reminded of the frequent efforts during the 
Bush Administration of officials seeking to immunize themselves from 
criminal liability through novel legal rationales or even legislation, all for 
the sake of unbridled assaults on terrorists.52 I hope we are not engaged in a 
similar exercise when confronting lawfare. I suggest we confront lawfare 
head on with the knowledge and integrity that befits a nation acting in com-
pliance with federal and international law. 
 
  
 52 See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TORTURE BY THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2010) and supra note 18.   
